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Global Crisis
OtaviO SOareS Dulci 
the economic crisis began sneakily when the bubble in the u.s. real estate market burst. In mid 2007, what appeared to be a sectoral disturbance – mortgages granted without sufficient guarantees – was 
seen by the rest of the world as a u.s. problem. nevertheless, a monumental 
financial contraption was uncovered assembled from derivatives of bonds and 
that functioned in a speculative dynamics with no ties to the real value of the 
goods to which they were originally linked. the size of the problem grew with 
each news report about the involvement of banks and investors in various parts 
of the world in this game without limits.
 Meanwhile, Brazil’s economic environment had an unprecedented 
glow. In 2007, large government and private projects had been announced in 
an optimistic atmosphere that continued into 2008 with even greater vigor. 
the developing financial crisis in other countries was not being ignored, but its 
influence on Brazil and other so-called “emerging” countries was considered 
residual. For a long time, it was widely asserted that the emerging economies 
were detached from the crisis in the central countries. 
 Given the growing integration of those economies to global capitalism, 
it was not reasonable to imagine that they were immune to the turbulence. an 
attempt was made to evaluate the degree of decoupling, under the presumption 
that the impact of the crisis would differ according to the characteristics and 
circumstances of each country. this factor is of great importance in the analysis 
of the process, and in steering government policies and the decisions of private 
agents. thus, in the case of Brazil, which is of greater interest to us, it makes 
sense to analyze the country’s specific conditions, vulnerable factors and 
comparative advantages in this unstable scenario.
 Brazil was relatively protected from the disaster in the u.s. and european 
financial systems, thanks to the solidity of its banks and to the better supervision 
by the public agencies responsible for the financial sector. Beginning with the 
Central Bank, such agencies have proven to be better structured and focused 
than their counterparts in various important countries. In addition, Brazilian 
regulations do not facilitate the paper games that led so many traditional banks 
in other countries to delirium and then insolvency. thus, on the side of the 
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institutions, we have advantages that were built over time – the many years of 
learning in the fight against inflation, in search of monetary stability, resulting in 
cautions that today help us weather the storm. 
 on the side of production and commerce, however, the crisis gradually 
hit the emerging countries on two fronts. the first was credit, which became 
hard to obtain, expensive and eventually paralyzed, in the interbanking market, 
and in that offered by banks to companies. on the other front, prices plunged 
for basic export products or   commodities – raw materials and foods whose 
prices had reached record levels in the first semester of 2008. 
 the price of petroleum had also skyrocketed, making alcohol fuel 
a popular alternative, sparking a global debate about the inconvenience of 
large scale sugar cane cultivation, because of its environmental impact, and 
particularly because of the pressure the cane fields placed on food supplies. the 
use of land to fuel motors instead of feeding people is certainly a shocking idea. 
While the debate involved good arguments, it was also influenced by multiple 
interests, including petroleum companies, competitors with biofuels. In any 
case, the situation changed so quickly that the debate about food shortages now 
seems so remote that it will probably be forgotten in the narrative of the crisis – 
until the problem reappears, because the risk cannot be denied.
 the year 2008  thus went from one extreme to another. It began under 
threat of inflation and scarcity. It ended with recession, unemployment and 
threat of deflation. 
 and now? What will happen? this is the million dollar question. everyone 
is looking for advice and opinions differ widely. there are gloomy predictions, as 
well as more animating prophecies. economic indicators are carefully examined. 
the constant information about losses at banks and financial institutions are 
avidly followed to determine the size of the  problem to be resolved.
 that is the stage of operations of the specialists – economists, market 
analysts, entrepreneurs, rent seekers and investors. they have the technical tools 
to interpret the economic and financial data and evaluate their consequences. In 
this text, I do not intend to advance in that field, but to contribute to an analysis 
that incorporates political, social and historical factors to the understanding 
of the current crisis, in connection with the economic factors that occupy the 
center of attention.
elements for a Research agenda
 I begin by indicating some theoretical and methodological elements 
that deserve careful analysis. the first concerns the notable fact that the crisis 
came as a great surprise not only to the general public, but also to specialists. 
Few foresaw it. those who did were seen as spoil-sports or even as promoters of 
speculative interests.
 alan Greenspan, who led the u.s. Central Bank – the Federal Reserve 
– until early 2006, had warned ten years earlier of the “irrational exuberance” 
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of the markets. He was in a privileged observation post, and could also observe 
the subprime mortgages and the financial instruments guaranteed by them. 
It is quite revealing that Greenspan did not interfere, while he had regulatory 
authority, in this uncertain situation. He later explained that he did not because 
he trusted the market’s self regulatory capacity. “I made a mistake in presuming 
that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks, is such that they were 
best capable of protecting shareholders and equity in the firms”, Greenspan 
stated at u.s. congressional hearings on oct. 23, 2008. He added:  “those 
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief”.1
 What is at issue, in this declaration, is the very philosophical basis of the 
free market system: the idea of the “invisible hand”, guided by the self-interest 
of the agents and their capacity for rational choice, resulting, in the aggregate, 
in collective benefits. economics, as science, has produced in the last three 
centuries an entire body of  theoretical propositions, measurement formulas, 
test techniques and robust empiric results. a good portion of its data is inspired 
by the principle of the “invisible hand”. the crisis has made the limitations of 
that paradigm quite clear. the disaster was not foreseen, or, if there were hints, 
they were not properly read. Certain critical insufficiencies are displayed in the 
economic theory and in its application to the real world.
 the other social sciences, however, do not have a great advantage over 
economics. after all, no political scientist predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the deep changes that such an event would cause. signs of change were seen 
in eastern europe throughout the 1980s –  and Gorbachev’s opening marked 
a good part of that period – but the collapse of the Wall in 1989 was a great 
surprise to everyone.
 It is useful to recall that moment of contemporary history, insofar as 
it is related to the subsequent expansion of unregulated capitalism, as Rubens 
Ricupero (2008) indicated in a recent article. there is also another reason: such 
analysis can help deal with the difficulty science has in understanding human 
behavior in society. economic field studies are full of uncertainty, as are political 
field studies. and both gain explanatory scope when they cooperate with each 
other. 
a possible way to confront those uncertainties is to work simultaneously 
with the long and short term. that is, with one eye on the historical process and 
another on the specific contexts. this is the second element to be highlighted in 
the research agenda for the crisis.
 thus, to focus on the nexus between the fall of the soviet Block and the 
subsequent trajectory of capitalism that led to today’s problems is one type of 
long term historic approach. But the question of how the events took place, and 
in what sequence, is answered by context analyses.  
 a reconstitution of those situations is one way to help explain crises. the 
crash of 1929 and the Great depression of the 1930s provided important studies 
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in this line (Galbraith, 1977). their reading offers us the linking of facts and of 
personalities that wind up converging on the financial disaster. nevertheless, this 
ending was not a given: it was constructed by a series of decisions or omissions 
made by specific actors. a cognitive quality of context analyses is to avoid 
fatalistic, rigidly deterministic visions, allowing the observation of history as an 
open process, conducted by real people – although not exactly as they would 
like, as Marx cautioned.  
 the exercise of counterfactual history is interesting for sketching 
scenarios alternative to those that in fact occurred. suppose that certain 
individual decisions had been different. For example, that Greenspan had 
interfered in the stock market bubble, when he issued his opinion about 
“irrational exuberance” in the mid 1990s. or, that u.s. authorities in sept. 
2008 had not let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt. this event is unanimously 
considered as a crucial moment in the process, that is, the turning point that 
transformed it into a generalized crisis of confidence. It resulted, of course, 
from a political decision, based on a vision analogous to Greenspan’s. It was 
supported by the principle that it would not be correct to use public money to 
save a failed private bank. If the profits belong to the directors and shareholders, 
why should the losses be spread to the people? and there was also a practical 
reason: to save a failing bank would create a precedent for saving others – how 
far would this go? nevertheless, it was a miscalculated decision, judging by 
its devastating global effects and by the rapid shift in attitude of the decision 
makers themselves, who soon came to prepare rescue measures for other weak 
banks.
 on this same ground on which economic and political facts meet, it 
is worth mentioning another fateful september: that of 2001. the terrorist 
attacks on new York and Washington created an ominous environment in the 
united states, leading the u.s. Central Bank to relax controls to reanimate the 
economy. Many analysts locate the origin of the mortgage crisis in that period.
 a third element on the agenda concerns the importance of identifying 
the different impacts of the crisis in different countries and regions of the world, 
something that was mentioned in passing at the beginning of this text in relation 
to the Brazilian situation. Recent decades have witnessed international economic 
crises of various calibers – the Mexican crisis, the Russian crisis, the southeast 
asian crisis – which hit other so-called “emerging” countries, such as Brazil 
by triggering uncertainty. In these cases, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and its partner, the u.s. government, acted to coordinate resources in 
exchange for bitter counter measures. the current crisis is quite distinct insofar 
as it emerged at the heart of global capitalism: Wall street. From there it spread 
widely, but its impact appears to vary according to the involvement of countries, 
financial institutions and companies with that epicenter and its practices. 
 the circuit is planetary, but it is not homogeneous. at the turn of 2008-
2009, it was found that the countries of the center were entering recession. 
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the situation seemed somewhat different in the “emerging” countries.  their 
economies simply decelerated, with the high growth rates of recent years 
reduced. and there are distinctions to be made among those countries. variables 
such as the size of each country’s domestic market and its degree of autonomy 
in relation to the world economy are crucial determinants of vulnerability to 
the crisis. In addition, the conditions of the domestic financial system, and its 
foreign dependence, are also certainly important. 
 Iceland is a good example of disadvantages in all of these items. Iceland, 
a pleasant country of 300,000 people, had an economy based on fishing and 
tourism until, at the beginning of this century, it made a daring step and 
became an important financial center. Its few banks attracted investments from 
many origins. It was celebrated as a sort of showcase of the benefits of the free 
flow of capital. But when the winds changed, the dream collapsed miserably.   
 other countries, particularly those in Central and eastern europe, have 
also proven to be quite vulnerable to the rise and fall of the flow of foreign 
resources, and without the ability to react on their own initiative. In those cases 
the drop in growth threatened to be deeper and longer lasting, so much so that 
the International Monetary Fund, which was nearly inoperative, reappeared to 
offer life preservers to save the shipwrecked. since the end of 2008, the IMF 
has granted loans to ukrania, Byelorussia, Latvia, Hungary and serbia; other 
countries in the region will probably need the same.
neoliberal Globalization: origins and Consequences
 the recognition of differences is the basis for making comparisons that 
allow reaching more solid inferences about the crisis and its consequences than 
permitted by the amount of knowledge we have today. at this stage we do not 
know much about it. Ideas of all kinds have circulated the world, but do not 
always have sufficient analytical consistency. For this reason, we can use as a 
guide the transformations of recent decades and see what is happening now in 
this context. a review of the past is essential for any anticipation of the future.
 the core of the changes that have been observed in the last thirty years is 
well described by the idea of neoliberal globalization. It refers to the integration 
of peoples of the world stimulated by rapid technological and organizational 
innovations, which influenced the sphere of culture and forms of sociability. 
although this movement is commonly associated to economic relations, its scope 
has been much wider.
 René dreifuss (1996), in a detailed study of the issue, proposed 
using distinct concepts to consider the complexity of the process. He used 
“globalization” to refer to the economic dimension, related to changes in the 
sphere of technology, production, finance and commerce, which hit all the 
countries of the world in an unequal and combined form, and not only those 
which operate on a global scale. He suggested two other terms to describe 
changes in the social, cultural and political spheres: “worldization”, to represent 
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the trend towards a homogeneity of behavior, consumption standards  and 
lifestyles; and “planetarization” to refer to the political-strategic sphere, i.e. to 
the shifts of power on a transnational scale. although this might seem like word 
play, it  expresses well the variety of factors to be examined in addressing the 
issue.
 the rebirth of economic liberalism, after a long period  of low prestige, 
provided intellectual justification for the policies that supported the global 
transformations. those policies, summarized in the motto “less government, 
more market”, were based on the primacy of individual liberty over social equity, 
seeking to separate the economy from politics.
 they represented, in this sense, an inversion of the global institutional 
arrangement predominant since the Great depression – politically regulated 
economies and social welfare policies. under that old arrangement, governments 
had assumed more direct control of economic life, to weaken the effects of the 
crisis. a classic  example of such move was the Roosevelt government’s new deal 
in the united states. Later, governments came to perform new roles, including 
the planning and financing of private projects and even the provision of direct 
investments (for mixed capital or completely government-owned companies). 
In parallel, they adopted social policies that also contradicted the old liberal-
individualistic consensus. Laws to protect workers were introduced, as well as 
social security systems and mass social services, establishing what is called the 
Welfare states. 
 there were important variations among the countries as to the degree of 
government intervention in the economy and the provision of social well-being. 
It is worth mentioning such variations because they are closely related to what 
happened later and also to the perspectives for the future. 
In the economic field, the main variations were linked to the 
phenomenon of unequal development, which stimulated a wide variety of 
theories about backward or late economies and their consequences. the notion 
that economic delays largely explain the differences between development models 
strongly influenced studies of macro-historical change. suggested by trotsky and 
veblen in the early 20th century, that hypothesis was tested by Gerschenkron 
(1965), who, studying experiences of industrialization in various european 
countries, concluded that the larger the economic hiatus to be overcome, the 
greater the degree of politicization (or  of  “organized direction” in his words) 
taken on in the process of its overcoming. In other words, the farther it is 
removed from a free-market system, which corresponds to the original model of 
industrialization (the British model),  but which is not repeatable by backward 
countries precisely because they are behind and must seek shortcuts.
 along with this approach, which emphasizes institutional factors 
(particularly the role of the state), there is the line of sociological studies 
that expands the focus to encompass the tensions and arrangements among 
important social actors during the trajectory of modernization. the strategies 
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of the elites and class interests are highlighted as important variables for 
understanding the different routes taken by the countries towards modernity.2
 as far as social policies are concerned, esping-andersen (1990), one of 
the main specialists in the field, studied the formation of three types of Welfare 
states. He maintains that each type is associated to a certain social and political 
configuration in each country, notably the class coalition in power. the result is 
an assemblage of different schemes to guarantee well being.
 thus, there are states with strong liberal traditions that limit the right 
to public assistance to those who can prove need, in order to sustain the market 
as the center of social life as much as possible. the best known example is the 
united states. In contrast, there are those governments of a socialist orientation, 
such as sweden, where the welfare system is universal,  and everyone benefits, 
through government financing. the third type is the so-called corporate model, 
which originated in Continental europe. social benefits were adopted by the 
governments to contemplate select categories (for example the military and civil 
servants) and extended over time to other sectors. this third formula was the one 
by which Brazil began to establish its social security and welfare system in the 
first half of the 20th century. It is still influential in the country, despite efforts 
to implement universal services, such as the national Healthcare system (sus). 
notwithstanding the differences among these models, the expansion 
of social policies was a strong feature of the post-second World War period 
throughout the world. the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by the growing 
idea of welfare promotion as a strategic task of governments. nevertheless, in 
the 1970s, the relative consensus around  this orientation began to recede, in 
such a way that in short time the perception of the “crisis of the state” became 
widespread. 
 there are various explanations for this reversal. one interesting 
interpretation was presented by vacca (1991, cap. 3), who distinguished three 
dimensions of the process: the fiscal crisis, the crisis of legitimacy and the crisis 
of governability.
 First, the prognosis that the expansion of the Welfare state would lead 
to a serious fiscal crisis gained influence. the ability to finance the demand 
for services and public spending, which grew along with the deepening of 
democracy, the rise in educational levels and the general improvement in the 
quality of life was questioned. the demand has no limits, while the services 
depend on the ability of the state to collect revenue. the ability to tax, in turn, 
is limited by various factors, both economic and political. the level of economic 
growth is one of them: if the economy is growing, things go well; but, if there is 
a decline, tax revenue tends to fall while social spending tends to increase (due to 
the greater volume of unemployment insurance, the poor health conditions that 
result from the increased poverty of the population and so on). 
 the 1950s and 1960s were prosperous decades. they are remembered as 
the “golden years”. But in the 1970s the postwar international economic order 
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gave way to growing disorder, with successive crises  –  the two petroleum crises, 
the crisis of foreign debt of the peripheral countries and economic-financial 
rivalries among the central countries. Conflicting pressures were placed on 
governments by both capital and labor, reducing the margin of governability of 
the system.
 such pressures were expressed by opposite analyses of the Welfare 
state and what to do with it. the crisis of legitimacy of the contemporary 
state is linked precisely to this disagreement. While the owners of capital 
and their representative agencies proposed limiting social spending, unions 
and workers’ parties questioned the system of protection as a mechanism to 
accommodate workers within the capitalist system. the latter criticism, of a 
socialist inspiration, indicated the insufficiencies of the welfare system. Left-
wing critics had had their day, but in the 1980s they lost strength in light of the 
reappearance of the liberal perspective that pointed to the opposite direction – 
criticizing the excesses of government action.
 the crisis, from that perspective, was caused by the abandonment of 
the “natural” principles of the market economy in favor of political and thus 
artificial solutions. this ideology maintains that state control of economic life, 
the paternalism of the Welfare state, labor laws and union pressures disrupt 
the labor market.  according to the liberal canon, economics and politics are 
separate spheres that should not be confused. the expansion of social and labor 
rights constitutes improper interference of the political sphere over the economy, 
altering the natural course of market dynamics. this confusion was blamed for 
the crisis of the state and the decline of economic growth. 
 these ideas returned when the relative consensus around the Welfare 
state showed signs of weakness. In the 1980s, the new model was adopted to 
replace the Welfare state. the label it received – neoliberalism – expressed well 
its goal of restoring old ideas to deal with new realities. 
 neoliberalism was thus a proposal to return to liberal tradition, but it 
did not defend – and that would not have been possible – a return to the past. 
the distinction with its classic source was, in the first place, the fact that it had 
to consider the social rights that were part of the modern notion of citizenship, 
as well as the rule of democratic political rights that were difficult to reconcile 
with the individualist ethic (especially those that refer to collective subjects, 
such as unions, movements and various associations). In other words, between 
the periods of the old and the new liberalism an entire institutional architecture 
had been raised that could not simply be dismantled. there were no political 
conditions to erase it and this would probably not be interesting to capitalism 
itself. no system of power can endure without a minimum of popular legitimacy. 
 For this reason the neoliberal formula found a  suitable translation in 
the theme “less government, more market”. the idea was to transfer as much 
functions as possible to the market sphere, leaving to the state only those 
which could not be privatized. the concept was crystal clear, but its practical 
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application was not univocal. neoliberal-inspired programs were introduced 
by governments in countless countries, although with many variations. a 
generic classification of these programs would lead us to distinguish between 
governments of conservative orientation and governments of a social-democratic 
bent (and even socialist, as in the case of China). the first tended to adopt an 
affirmative liberalism that was viscerally ideological, while the second promoted 
a pragmatic mixture of liberal and social ideas.
 the icons of conservative neoliberalism were the thatcher government 
in the united Kingdom  (1979-1991), and the Reagan administration in the 
united states (1981-1989). the term Reaganomics was coined to designate the 
economic orientation that emphasized what was called supply-side economics. 
Meanwhile, the assimilation of neoliberal policies by social-democratic 
governments had its best examples in the Gonzalez government in spain (1982-
1996), which served as a model for various Latin american governments, and 
the Mitterrand government in France (1981-1995). all of these governments 
adopted measures influenced by the “less government, more market” concept, 
but each at its own pace and with different proposals. 
 Looking back, the neoliberal period can be divided into three phases. 
the first, from 1979 to 1989, began with the election of thatcher in the united 
Kingdom and culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall. this was the phase 
of affirmation of the project in both the economic and political planes. It was 
expressed, in the British situation, through privatizations and a confrontation 
with the union movement, in order to subjugate labor and impose a hegemony 
of capital according to the new model. Meanwhile, in the u.s. situation, the 
shrinking of  government did not involve privatizations (because the country 
did not have state companies to sell), but large scale deregulation, along with 
intensified confrontation with the communist block, with an impressive growth 
in weapons and technology that would decisively weaken the soviet union. 
the liberal thinkers and ideologues, active in economic formulation, were 
joined by the neoconservatives, who defended the u.s. mission to implant 
liberal democracy worldwide, by force if necessary. this was a rising intellectual 
movement that defended the strengthening of military power to promote u.s. 
interests and principles globally with moral clarity and without mincing words.
 neoliberal globalization reached its peak in the 1990s. With the end 
of the Cold War, the era of the pax americana embraced the planet, a type of 
benign command of the international system by the only superpower in action. 
Liberal ideas were disseminated in conjunction with this movement and codified 
in the celebrated Washington Consensus. Pro-market reforms, free-trade, free 
flow of capital,  weakening of regulatory norms –  these policies led throughout 
the world to economic growth, improved family income and reduced poverty 
(but not of social inequality, which in fact tended to increase). nevertheless, a 
series of crises erupted in peripheral countries, which, precisely because they 
were peripheral, did not serve as a warning to identify systemic problems. such 
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crises were often perceived as local deficiencies, to be cured by greater doses of 
the same medicine (i.e. “less government, more market”).3  the self-confidence 
of the leaders and ideologues of the model reached its peak. For example: in the 
united states, the Clinton government deepened Reagan’s deregulation policies 
by abolishing the separation between commercial and investment banks in 1999, 
a prudential norm that had been in force since the depression. this measure is 
now understood as an incentive to the financial bedlam that triggered the crisis 
of 2008. 
 the third phase began on sept. 11, 2001 with the terrorist attacks 
on new York and Washington. this event dissolved the optimism of the pax 
americana, which was replaced  by the war on terrorism. In the united states, 
the belligerent positions of the neoconservatives gained prominence, with the 
application of theses such as preventive war and unilateral interventionism, 
thus disrupting the weak coordinating ability of the united nations. the 
religious right also gained influence, aligning its moral conservatism to 
popular messianic patriotism. the Bush government served as an estuary for 
those various movements. neoliberal economic orientation was maintained,  
expanding consumption through abundant credit.  nevertheless, the liberal 
policies of the 1990s lost ground. such was the environment in which the 
financial crisis erupted.
What is Changing?
 this brief panorama suggests a pendular view of the market-state 
relationship. the 20th century was the century of the state, to the degree that 
it was highlighted by political projects supported by active, interventionist 
governments: soviet-style communism, fascism, social democracy, and 
Keynesian, regulated capitalism. It is clear the contrast with the 19th century, 
when there was growing consensus around liberal ideas. the main  traits of a 
globalized economy were already manifest at that earlier time: a world united by 
trade, by transportation and communication networks, by flows of capital and 
migrant labor.  
 the 20th century, however, began and ended under the aegis of the 
free market. the primacy of the state and the support for economic and social 
regulation rigorously corresponded to the period between 1914 and 1989. More 
precisely, the “brief 20th century”, as Hobsbawn defined it, was steered by the 
rise, expansion and decadence of soviet communism. to a large degree, it was as 
a counterpoint to this formula for social revolution that the other three political 
projects referred to above were established. not to mention the revival of the 
liberal ideology, which had aged and lost influence for decades.
 the latter returned in a recycled manner, presented as an alternative 
to the crisis of the state. the scale tipped toward the market. the principle of 
depoliticization of the economy gained space  and was made concrete in the 
privatization initiatives, deregulation and reduction of government role (as 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 115
well as of its size and cost). But the handling of political resources, the means 
of control and power, was essential for all of this to take place. only through 
ideological credulity could it be said that the market would recover its function 
as a spontaneous skeleton of social life. From the time period suggested above, 
we could infer that the neoliberal globalization project was affirmed dialectically, 
through confrontations against internal antagonists (unions, civil servants, 
social movements) or external ones (the communist block and later the terrorist 
networks and the “axis of evil”), nourished by constant mobilization against 
real or manufactured enemies.
 the hegemony of financial capitalism could only be achieved by political 
means, through the opportune management of power resources. this can be 
demonstrated by a study of the relations between economic and political elites 
in several countries. the image of a “revolving door” has been used to portray 
the constant circulation of members of the elites through government positions 
and private companies. such interchange is notorious in the financial field and 
affects the governability of the system, as the current crisis has made clear. 
Perhaps this reality is what could be expected from a “less government, more 
market” movement, meaning less power to the public bureaucracy and more 
power to business, bankers and private managers in general. It does make sense 
as long as the responsibilities are properly shared. Hegemony, to recall Gramsci, 
is intellectual and moral leadership.
  For this reason, one of the principal consequences of the crisis is that the 
absolute power of financial capital has been put into question. Capitalism as a 
system is not at risk, but the banks, investment institutions, risk analysis agencies 
and all of the paraphernalia that developed around them, have lost clout. to 
rebuild their reputation, the banks and financial market agents will have to re-
establish their primordial function as support for the real economy. 
 this is a normative proposition but has a practical side, given that the big 
international banks are not able to confront the crisis without government help. 
therefore, they must submit to certain political conditions. the governments, 
representing public opinion, demand greater transparency and management 
austerity, given the revelations of huge salaries, benefits and gratifications 
bestowed on the administrators of banks and institutions on the brink of 
insolvency. a true salary bubble was revealed, which was not linked to reality. 
even worse, it was not tied to the interests of the companies themselves, which 
were paying dearly for those who led them to the abyss for short term gains. 
nothing could be farther from the puritan ethic that justified capitalism.
 With the government rescue of banks and companies, the principle 
of separation between the economy and politics was broken. In other words, 
governments once again came to participate directly in the game, and in a strong 
position. even if this is seen as an emergency measure, it is a situation that moves 
the pendulum toward the state, as occurred in the crisis that began in 1929. Is it 
possible that we are facing the end of an era, as in the 1930s?
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 the comparison between the two crises has been frequent, and not 
by chance. the causes of both events were quite similar. the direction of the 
process has also followed the same course, from the center to the periphery 
of the world capitalist system. Both began in the financial arena and extended 
to the real economy. or, according to the suggestive expression used in u.s. 
debate, the crisis began on Wall street and spread to Main street, where the 
common citizens live. nevertheless, the world was very different 80 years ago. 
It was more rural and provincial than today. Many of the current countries were 
still colonies. trade was more limited, and the scale of transactions relatively 
modest. the international division of labor distinguished the few industrial 
countries from the others, which sold agricultural products or minerals and 
purchased manufactured goods. 
 In any case, the political and social consequences of the crash of 1929 
are worth considering. they were of broad scope. there was a collapse in the 
belief in liberal values and in a world guided by the self-regulated market. In 
its place, as we indicated before, active, interventionist  governments asserted 
themselves, varying from moderate to deep intervention and even total 
intervention (totalitarianism). the central values of the 1930s were the strong 
state, nationalism, racism, corporativism, the command economy and widespread 
politicization of social life. due to the economic crisis, countries became more 
insulated. each attempted to survive on its own. trade and exchange declined. 
the international order was compromised, the arms race expanded and a 
solution for global disorder was only achieved at the end of a long world war 
which cost millions of lives. the only positive balance was the emphasis on the 
social question. although in many cases (as in Brazil), that advance replaced a 
constructive approach to the question of democracy.
 the most ominous political consequences of that time – dictatorships 
and war – do not seem probable, at least in the short term. nevertheless, 
xenophobia and racial pressures cannot be discarded. they are already manifest 
in ethnic conflicts in europe and other continents, and could be aggravated by 
the unemployment generated by the economic crisis. Barriers to immigration 
could certainly be tightened, and, in any case, the exodus of the poor towards 
the rich countries is not likely in times of want. If the flow is inverted, and 
immigrants return home, how will they be re-integrated, and what are the 
consequences of the lost flow of foreign currency which immigrants had sent 
from abroad? In the Central american countries, for example, those resources 
represent an important portion of national income. 
 In the economic arena, there are certain analogies that are not surprising.
one impulse similar to that found in the depression is protectionism. 
the initial u.s. measures to confront the economic crisis, for example, displayed 
a tendency to treat it as an internal problem that did not involve the rest of the 
world. their autism was revealed in the congressional attempts to introduce 
protective “buy american” clauses in the obama government’s large public 
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spending package.  of course broad reactions from abroad led legislators to 
review the package – particularly because the u.s. has often made open market 
demands on other countries.
 In situations such as that which the world is undergoing, there is a broad 
call for governments to act quickly and decisively, looking only inwards. even 
so, it is important to indicate that the best alternative to overcome the crisis 
is represented by coordinated measures, instead of each country for himself 
efforts. unlike 1929, there is now an embryo of global governance composed 
of multilateral entities and government forums (particularly G-20), which 
are  capable of promoting the search for joint solutions. Insofar as the various 
interests and needs are placed on the agenda, we have a chance to advance in 
a constructive direction. this would mean, among other things, focusing on 
production and labor more than on financial capitalism and on unchecked rent 
seeking, and also to approach the planet’s environmental challenges. 
 a crisis involves risks, but also creates opportunities. the current 
crisis curbed the “irrational exuberance” of globalized capitalism and the 
unsustainable pace of consumption and use of resources which, as we well know, 
are not unlimited. the opportunity to rethink this route is essential and cannot 
be lost.  
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notes
1  Cf. “Greenspan admite erro de ideologia à frente do Fed” at the website BBCBrasil.com, 
oct. 23, 2008. see also Greenspan (2007), where the author expresses his view of the 
economic dynamics in greater depth and justifies the decisions he made. 
2  there is an extensive bibliography in this field that came to be labelled Historical 
sociology. see Moore (1967) and Bendix (1996).
3  For an analysis of these crises see Krugman (2009).
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AbstrAct – the article deals with the current crisis of world capitalism, relating 
its specifically economic aspects to political and institutional questions raised by the 
financial crash. It discusses some cognitive and methodological issues that are relevant to 
a research agenda of the process, followed by an overview of the development of neoliberal 
globalization. this model, which characterized the world during the last few decades, is at 
the heart of the contemporary economic problems. the article concludes with a brief look at 
the changes that may result from the crisis, especially those related to the strengthening of 
politics and the role of the state.
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